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ABSTRACT 
 
Financial theory states that the variability of an asset’s return should be explained by the 
relative riskiness of that asset (Sharpe, 1964).  This concept has been built around, and 
applied to, publicly-listed companies for which market information (which forms the 
basis of the risk and return measures) is easily visible and obtainable.  Unfortunately, the 
fact that such information is rarely (if ever) available for small businesses, severely limits 
the usefulness of such a theory for privately-held enterprises.  Therefore by using data 
from 100 small businesses and three measures of risk, this study provides empirical 
evidence that for small businesses, there is no significant relationship between financial 
returns and risk, but there is a relationship between the level of control exerted by the 
owners of a firm and the financial returns of that firm.  This paper also provides evidence 
that owners with little or no control of a firm, take action to prevent agency costs.  This 
action is in the form of disbursements to shareholders, rather than using debt as a means 
of reducing agency costs. 
 
Ed Vos and Bronwyn Smith. The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance and Business Ventures. Vol 8 No 1. April 2003, pp 31-56.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
 
The relationship between risk and return is fundamental to modern financial theory.  Put 
simply, it assumes that as the riskiness of an asset or investment increases, so should the 
expected return (‘return’ being the financial return achieved, and ‘risk’ being defined as 
the variability of returns).  Investors choose whether or not to invest or own assets 
depending on their personal appetite for risk.   
 
This risk/return relationship has been well researched for large publicly listed companies, 
but its application to small business enterprise has been limited.  As small business is an 
ambiguous term due to a number of definitions, for the purpose of this report small 
business will mean unlisted, privately-held business (McConaughy, Matthews and Fialko 
(2001)).  Given that a majority of businesses can be considered as small, it is important to 
establish how (and indeed whether) these businesses fit into the framework of modern 
financial theory. 
 
Therefore the purpose of this paper is to empirically test for a relationship between risk 
and return for small businesses, and to also test whether the level of control owners of a 
firm have will affect the returns of that firm.  The next section covers a brief review of 
the past literature, followed by the data (section 3) and methodology (section 4).  Section 
5 outlines the results and section 7 concludes.   
 
2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
In the world of publicly traded stocks there have been many attempts made to formulate 
the relationship between risk and return.  One of the most recognised methods of defining 
this relationship is the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) developed by Sharpe (1964).  
The CAPM identified a positive relationship between the expected return on stock and 
Beta.  While initial tests of this model on publicly traded stocks supported this 
relationship (see Black, Jensen and Scholes (1972); Fama and McBeth (1973)), it has 
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increasingly been the subject of disapproval.  Fama and French (1992) were very critical 
of the usefulness of Beta.  In place of the CAPM, Fama and French (1993) used a three-
factor model to represent the relationship between risk and return.  They found firm’s 
size and the ratio of the book value to market value of its common equity were better 
proxies for risk.  However Fama and French’s work has also be criticised (see Kothari, 
Shanken, and Sloan (1995); Haugen (1999)) which they defended in Fama and French 
(1996). 
 
In the world of small business finance the relationship between risk and return is even 
more difficult to determine.  Attempts to apply the above risk/return models have been 
met with very limited success.  Privately held firms are not traded regularly on a public 
exchange making it difficult to ascertain Beta and the expected returns necessary to apply 
the CAPM.  One solution to this problem was the idea of using an accounting Beta in 
place of the market-derived Beta.  The use of an accounting Beta was first proposed by 
Ball and Brown (1969) and spawned a variety of studies.  Vos (1992) investigated the 
usefulness of an accounting Beta for small businesses.  He concluded that the existing 
CAPM model and the use of accounting information are not adequate to capture the 
relationship between risk and return, as confirmed in a later study by Vos (1995). 
 
Fama and French’s (1993) three factor model is also of limited use for small businesses 
as it requires a market equity.  This market equity is difficult to determine for unlisted 
companies not publicly traded because there is no determined market price.  In an effort 
to resolve this problem, Vos (1995) used a sample of small businesses that had been sold, 
therefore creating an established market price for each business.  Vos found that 
accounting Betas are of limited use as a risk measure for small businesses, but he did find 
that book to market equity is helpful when related to return on assets (gross).  However 
the difficulty in determining the market price for a small business without it being sold is 
still present.  Thus new models need to be developed especially to understand the risk and 
return relationship for a small business.   
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Small firms have many characteristics that differentiate them from listed companies.  
McDowell (1995) believed these differentiating characteristics could be related to one 
feature – the integration of personal and business accounts.  The personal and business 
affairs of the owners of a small business may be inseparable.  Ang (1992) surmised this 
integration of accounts and the often unlimited liability of owners as meaning “business 
risk is no longer separable from personal risk as business bankruptcy could cause 
personal bankruptcy” (p. 186).  To develop this notion, this paper tests the relationship 
between the level of ownership in a small firm and the level of risk to the owner(s). 
 
This paper also examines the relationship between the level of control owners of a firm 
have and the financial returns of that firm.  This is, in effect, a study of the agency costs 
of a firm, as introduced by Jensen and Meckling (1976). Ang et al (2000) considered that 
“[w]hen management own less than 100 percent of the firm’s equity, shareholders incur 
agency costs resulting from management’s shirking and perquisite consumption.” (p. 81).  
They examined these agency costs across a wide range of ownership structures, from the 
firms whose managers own 100 percent of the firm to those whose managers are paid 
employees with no equity in the firm.  The author’s conclusions were that agency costs; 
• are higher when an outsider (non-owner) manages the firm,  
• vary inversely with the manager’s ownership share, and  
• increase with the number of non-manager shareholders a firm has.   
Their results also showed that firms managed by owners exhibited greater efficiency and 
better asset utilisation. 
 
Vos and Forlong (1998) looked at the role of debt in minimizing agency costs for firms.  
Their study ranged from small businesses, to the initial pubic offering (IPO) stage, 
through to listed companies.  They found that small, unlisted firms gain very few tax or 
agency advantages from debt, tending rather to take on debt only out of necessity.  
However, they did find that debt reduced agency costs at the IPO stage and this 
advantage was enhanced in mature listed companies.  In relation to debt, this paper 
explores empirically, whether debt is related to the level of control exerted by the owners 
of a firm. 
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3.0 DATA 
 
Small business data is often very difficult to obtain.  This unique data was drawn 
from a sample of 100 ‘bank’ (the company wishes to remain anonymous) customer files.  
The four Senior Business Managers at this bank hold a total portfolio of 226 customers.  
Each customer is assigned a randomly generated Customer Registration Number (CRS) 
from which the first 25 were taken from each manager’s portfolio.  Figures 1, 2 and 3 
below show the spread of the sample by industry and size (in terms of numbers of staff 
and value of total assets).  
 
Table 1: 
Distribution of Sample by Industry  
 
Industry Number of Firms 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 4 
Manufacturing 31 
Property and Construction 4 
Wholesale Trade 29 
Retail Trade 5 
Accommodation and Restaurants 2 
Transport and Storage 6 
Communication Services 1 
Finance 2 
Business Services 12 
Health and Community Services 3 
Media and Culture 1 
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Figure 1: 
Spread of Sample by Size (Number of Employees) 
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Figure 2: 
Spread of Sample by Size (Value of Total Assets) 
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A spreadsheet was formed to collate financial statement data, bank assigned risk 
grade, distance grade (as defined below) and industry and staff number information for 
each firm.  Where possible, the data was collected from the latest three years of financial 
statements on file.  In some cases, only one or two years were available.  From this raw 
data, the mean value for each data item (e.g. Total Assets, Net Profit after Tax) over the 
three year period has been used in the analysis.  This means the average financial 
statements for each company have been used in order to smooth out any inconsistencies 
in any single year. 
 
The sample is a group of ‘bank’ customers (largely Auckland based), and as such, is 
biased towards Auckland businesses that utilise bank funding and fit the risk appetite of 
the bank.  Further, the data gathered for this report has been based on information 
presented in the customer files which is prepared by the customers’ respective bank 
managers.  Assessment of things such as the business’ reliance on the owner(s) and 
individual business risks are dependent on the manager’s perception and judgement 
ability. 
 
4.0  METHODOLOGY 
 
For each customer, the following variables have been calculated on the basis of the 
information collected above. 
 
Financial Return: Measured for each company in four different ways: 
 
(i) Return on Equity (ROE) 
(Net Profit After Tax + Above Line Shareholder Disbursements) 
Quasi Equity 
 
Where: 
o Above the line shareholder disbursements includes payments to 
shareholders that are deducted before profit calculation.  This includes 
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items such as salaries, wages and bonuses, interest paid on shareholder 
loans, management fees and directors fees. 
o Quasi equity = (Total Ordinary Equity + Loans from Shareholders – 
Loans to Shareholders).  Quasi equity is a unique characteristic of the 
closely held business.  Use of quasi equity in calculating shareholder 
return will give a clearer picture of the actual funds invested. 
Shareholders either: 
- lend to the business (either directly or through retention of 
profits/salaries in their current accounts) to fund business 
assets; or 
- borrow from the business for personal use. 
 
(ii)  Return on Assets (ROA) 
 
Net Profit After Tax+ Above Line Shareholder Disbursements 
Total Assets 
 
 
(iii)    Return on Equity – Gross (ROEG) 
 
Gross Profit 
Quasi Equity 
 
Where:  
o Gross Profit is profit before interest, tax, drawings, etc 
 
  
(iv) Return on Assets – Gross (ROAG) 
 
Gross Profit 
Total Assets 
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Risk Grade 
The bank assigns each customer a risk grade, which takes into consideration factors 
including: 
i. economic risk – how business performance is impacted by economic 
cycles; 
ii. firm/industry specific risk factors – such as client/supplier 
relationships, exposure to debtors, impacts of technological change, 
leverage, cash flow generation, reliance on management and ability 
of management. 
 
As such, the risk grade can be considered a proxy for systemic risk and non-systemic 
(firm specific) risk.  It should be noted that there is a third factor used in determination of 
risk grades by the bank.  The level of security held by the bank can have a bearing in 
some cases.  This study assumes that factors (i) and (ii) above are the overriding 
influence on risk grade. 
 
The risk grade ranges from 35 to 100, with 35 being the greatest risk.  35 is the lowest 
risk grade value of the sample because the bank will not lend money to businesses with 
risk grades lower than 35.   
 
Distance Grade 
The distance between the ultimate shareholder(s) of a firm and the managers, and the 
degree of reliance on owners for decision making and day-to-day running was assessed 
from customer files and from each responsible Business Manager’s understanding of the 
clients business.  Distance was assessed on a 1 - 9 scale, as set out in Table 1 below.  
Determining whether or not the owner provides personal guarantees to the bank assists 
with assessing how closely business/personal interests are inter-related. 
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Table 2:   
Distance Grading Scale 
Level: Characteristics: 
 
Examples 
1 1 owner who is sole owner/manager.  Responsible for all the 
decision making.   
 
Sole Proprietor 
 
2 2 or 3 owner/managers who work closely within the business.  
There are no non-owner managers.  Responsibility for decision 
making lies between them.   
 
Small Partnership or 
limited liability 
company. 
3 1 owner/manager who works closely within the business but is 
assisted by 1 or 2 senior level non-owner manager/s e.g. Financial 
controller.  Majority of the decision making is made by the 
owner/manager.   
 
 
Small business which 
have grown to the point 
where the owner 
requires some assistance 
to operate the business 
properly. 
4 1 or 2 non-managing owners who largely leave responsibility of the 
running of the business to 1 or 2 owner/managers.  All owners take 
part in any major decision making.  Owner/managers assume day-
to-day decision-making. 
 
A retired owner who has 
bought in a younger 
owner (maybe family 
member) to assist, 
possibly a take over - 
succession planning. 
5 Up to 5 non-managing owners who largely leave responsibility of 
the running of the business to 1 or 2 owner/managers.   Higher level 
decision making may be with reference to the non-managing 
owners. 
 
Sleeping partner(s) 
exist(s). 
6 1 owner who largely leaves responsibility of running the business to 
non-owner managers.  Higher level decision making may be with 
reference to the owner. 
 
 
7 Up to 5 non-managing owners who are involved in decision making 
at higher level but leave responsibility of running the business to a 
maximum of 3 non-owner senior managers.  Non-owner managers 
assume the majority of the decision making. 
 
 
8 A number of non-managing owners (largely domestic) directly own 
the business, but the business is run by a team of non-owner 
managers who assume all decision making.  
 
Medium sized NZ 
business, maybe 
approaching IPO stage. 
9 Many offshore shareholders whose ownership may be through 
offshore holding companies.  Large management team.  It is likely 
that shareholding will be through one or more offshore parent 
companies. 
The  NZ representation 
of a large multi-national 
firm 
Key:  
 
 
Personal g’tee is 
likely 
Personal g’tee may or 
may not be provided  
Personal g’tee not 
likely 
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Distance Measure 
Measured as the degree to which quasi equity (as defined above) and ordinary equity 
differ.  This can be considered a measure of the shareholder(s): 
o Willingness to contribute extra capital to fund business, and therefore 
their commitment to that business; i.e. shareholders provide funding for 
the business over and above ordinary equity (share capital). 
o Ability to draw funds from the business to fund other lifestyle interests.  
This could be for personal consumption, funding of property or another 
investment. 
 
The degree to which shareholders either borrow from or lend to their business can be 
considered an indication of how closely linked their personal and business affairs are. 
 
Thus, the Quasi Equity measure will be defined as the absolute value of:  
 
Ordinary Equity Ratio 
Paid up Capital + Retained Earnings 
Total Assets 
 
Less:   Quasi Equity Ratio 
Quasi Equity (as defined earlier) 
Total Assets 
 
By using the absolute value there is no distinction made between borrowing from, or 
lending to the business because both are considered to be characteristic of the more 
closely-held firm.  As such, firms with shareholders whose lending to or borrowing from 
the business is greater (proportional to the level of ordinary equity) will have greater 
distance measures. 
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Once all the data had been collected and variables calculated for each customer, the 
following analysis was performed to test for relationships among variables and identify 
any significant trends. 
 
Correlation Tests 
The four variables outlined above (Financial Return, Risk Grade, Distance Grade and 
Distance Measure) were tested for relationships with each other using the non-parametric 
Spearman Rank-Order Correlation Co-efficient test.  The Spearman rank-order 
correlation co-efficient (rs) is measured as: 
 
        
 
Where di = X i – Y i (the difference in the ranks on the two variables).  The 
significance of rs is tested by the statistic z = rs√ N – 1. 
 
The Spearman Rank-Order Correlation Co-efficient test is considered appropriate 
because: 
• The data includes a number of financial ratios, which are not normally distributed.  
Non-parametric statistics tests make no assumption with regard to the distribution 
of the data being tested. 
• Both variables (in all tests) are measured in an “ordinal” scale and can therefore 
be ranked. 
• This test reduces influence of “out-liers” that are likely to arise with ratio analysis.  
 
Median Tests 
The sample was split into groups as follows: 
 
i. Three groups with increasing Risk Grades Variables 
ii. Three groups with increasing Distance Grade Variables 
iii. Three groups with increasing Distance Measure Variables. 
∑x2 + ∑y2 - ∑di
2 
2√∑x2∑y2 
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Further to the correlation tests above, a median test was performed to test if the 
Financial Return Variables within each of (i), (ii) and (iii) were different.  This was done 
to ensure the same trends were observed under different test calculations.  The Median 
Test calculates the number of results above and below the total sample median in each 
group.  Results are placed in a contingency table of observed results and results expected 
if the Null Hypothesis is true. One tailed Chi Square Tests (χ2) tests the Null Hypothesis 
that the groups have come from a population with an equal median, and is measured as: 
        
Where: nij = the observed number of cases 
categorized in the ith row of the jth column. 
Eij= number of cases expected in the 
ith row of the jth column when Ho is true. 
 
Testing for agency cost control factors 
The use of debt and disbursements to shareholders have been identified as methods 
that owners who are further removed from management may use to control agency cost 
(see Jensen and Meckling (1976); Ang (1992, 2000)).  The sample was tested for the 
relationship of these control factors with the two distance variables, using the following 
tests:    
i. Spearman rank-order correlation tests were performed to test for a relationship 
between External Debt as a percentage of Total Assets and both Distance Grade and 
Distance Measure. 
ii. Spearman rank-order correlation tests were performed to test for a relationship 
between Dividends as a percentage of Net Profit After Tax and both Distance Grade 
and Distance Measure. 
iii. Spearman rank-order correlation tests were performed to test for a relationship 
between Total shareholder disbursements as a percentage of Net Operating Profit 
and both Distance Grade and Distance Measure.  Total shareholder disbursements 
are Above-line shareholder disbursements plus dividends.  Net Operating Profit is 
Net Profit After Tax plus Above-line shareholder disbursements. 
2 k  
∑ ∑ (nij – Eij)2 
i=1 j=1 Eij 
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iv. One tailed Chi Square Tests were performed on the three groups for each of 
Distance Grade and Distance Measure to test if there was a significant difference in 
the groups of the proportion of firms who simply “pay dividends” or “don’t pay 
dividends” as distance of the shareholder(s) increases. The Chi-Square test statistic 
(χ2) is calculated as for the Median Test above, and tests the Null hypothesis that the 
proportion of firms who “pay dividends” or “don’t pay dividends” is the same. 
v.      For increased robustness, non-directional Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Tests were also     
      carried out to test whether there was a difference in the financial returns between the  
firms in the sample with lower Distance Grades (1-4), i.e. more closely held firms, 
and the firms in the sample with Distance Grades of 5-9 (inclusive), that is, the more   
      distant firms. 
 
5.0  RESULTS 
 
Variables 
Table 3 below summarises the central tendency and distribution for each of the 
variables measured, based on the average figures. 
 
Table 3: 
Central Tendency and Distribution of Variables 
  Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
High Low 
Financial Return ROE -0.24104611 0.3391152 7.3846637 4.2282856 -72.5 
 ROA 0.24582813 0.1406692 0.3588336 1.6554894 -1.0114155 
 ROEG 0.89147381 1.5296423 9.5650237 19.758124 -81.4 
 ROAG 0.90459051 0.6548433 0.805924 4.7128126 -0.0637495 
Risk Grade  55 52 11.189822 92 35 
Distance Grade  4.51 4 2.5995143 10 1 
Distance Measure  0.18939 0.07975 0.2575714 1.0965287 0 
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Financial Return 
Financial Return variables were widely distributed (refer figures 3, 4, 5 and 6).  ROE and 
ROEG mean results were significantly influenced by outliers, with particularly large 
negative returns on equity.  For the purpose of creating meaningful graphs, two outliers 
were removed from the ROE and ROEG results graphed overleaf.  However, a median 
ROE of 33.9% and ROA of 14.1% indicates that overall, returns for this sample were 
relatively high when compared with a Risk Free Rate of Return ranging from around 
4.5% to 9.5% over the period (Risk Free Rate approximated by the 90 Day Bank Bill 
Rate over the three years from 1/1/97 to 31/12/99). 
 
Figure 3:      Figure 4: 
Spread of Return on Equity Results  Spread of Return on Assets 
Results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5:       
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5:      Figure 6: 
Spread of Return on Equity Gross Results Spread of Return on Assets Gross 
Results 
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Risk Grade 
Risk Grades ranged from 35 (greatest risk) to 92 (least risk). The sample was 
weighted towards the lower risk grade end (see Figure 7), with a concentration in the 40-
64 region. 
 
Figure 7: 
Spread of Sample across Risk Grades 
0
5
1 0
1 5
2 0
2 5
3 0
3
5
-3
9
4
0
-4
4
4
5
-4
9
5
0
-5
4
5
5
-5
9
6
0
-6
4
6
5
-6
9
7
0
-7
4
7
5
-7
9
8
0
-8
4
8
5
-8
9
9
0
-9
4
R is k  G r a d e
N
o
. 
o
f 
O
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s
 
 
Distance Grade 
Distance Grade was slightly skewed towards the lower (more closely-held) end, 
however the sample is relatively well spread (see Figure 8).  The concentration in the 3-5 
area indicates a greater number of firms adopted the structure of an owner-manager 
holding the majority of control, with assistance from internal non-owner managers for 
day-to-day management.   
 
Figure 8: 
Spread of Sample by Distance Grade 
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Distance Measure 
Distance Measures were skewed towards the lower end (i.e. more distant).  Of the 
observations, 24% had a lifestyle measure of less than 0.01, 41% less than 0.05 and 70% 
had measures less than 0.20.  Even though the resultant measures are small, they are still 
important considering the measure is relative to the value of the total assets of the 
business.  Although we have used an absolute measure in our analysis in order to assess 
owners lifestyle benefits (whether they be through personally investing in or borrowing 
from the business), it is interesting to note that of the 100 observations, 75 were actually a 
negative result. That is, they were making loans to the business in addition to their 
ordinary equity.  Twenty three drew loans from the business and two had a Distance 
Measure of zero. 
 
Figure 9: 
Spread of Sample by Distance Measure 
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Correlation between Variables 
Table 4, below, summarises the results of each of the individual Spearman Rank-
Order tests and their relative significance.  The Spearman rank-order correlation co-
efficient (rs) is shown, with the z-statistic for each test shown underneath (in brackets).  
Greater rs measures imply greater (positive or negative) association. 
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Table 4: 
Spearman Rank-Order Correlation Tests Between Variables 
  Risk Grade 
(least risk = 1) 
Distance Grade 
(most closely held = 1) 
Distance Measure 
(most distant = 1) 
Financial Return ROE 0.11746956 0.234216337 -0.18080408 
(greatest return = 1)   (1.16880736) (2.33042312) 
**** 
(-1.798977886) 
** 
 ROA 0.194110394 0.297326101 -0.366162616 
  (1.931374035) 
** 
(2.958357347) 
***** 
(-3.643272031) 
****** 
 ROEG -0.038348248 0.009608083 -0.050555056 
  (-0.381560246) (0.095599215) 
 
(-0.503016451) 
 ROAG 0.125420047 0.135838623 -0.221716172 
  (1.247913716) (1.351577232) 
* 
(-2.206048054) 
*** 
Risk Grade   -0.128175976 0.107823554 
   (-1.275334855) 
 
(1.072830817) 
Distance Grade    -0.218059935 
    (-2.169668961) 
*** 
Key: 
 ****** ***** **** *** ** * 
Significance Level (two-tailed test) 0.0005 0.005 0.01 0.025 0.05 0.1 
 
Financial Return Variables 
Return on Assets (ROA) was the return measure that recorded the most significant 
results with any of the other variables, and the only return measure that had any 
significant relationship with risk.  However, this result was interesting in that greater 
returns were associated with less risk.   
 
Return on Equity (ROE) and Return on Assets Gross (ROAG) recorded significant 
relationships with both distance measures, however Return on Equity Gross (ROEG) was 
not found to be significant with any of the other variables.  This is consistent with the 
findings of Vos (1995) who found ROAG to be the measure of return most strongly 
correlated with risk surrogates. 
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Risk Grade 
Risk Grade was found to be the least useful variable in the explanation of Financial 
Returns, and was not found to be correlated to either Distance Grade or Distance 
Measure. As indicated, Risk Grade was positively correlated with one variable, ROA, 
with higher returns being associated with less risk.  Whilst, as previously discussed, the 
robustness of the bank Risk Grade as a measure of risk could be considered somewhat 
questionable, the lack of significant correlation of Financial Return measures with Risk 
Grade adds further weight to the findings of Vos (1992, 1995), that small business risk 
and financial returns are not related.  However, the result does not support the 
suggestions of some (see Le Cornu et al (1996); Collins and Barry (1988)), that small 
business returns are related to total (systemic plus firm-specific) risk. 
 
Distance Grade 
Significant relationships were found between Financial Return (ROE, ROA, and 
ROAG) and Distance.  ROA returned the greatest correlation and most significant result.  
The test insinuates an association between more closely-held firms and greater Financial 
Returns. This supports the agency theory prediction that those firms likely to have more 
prevalent small firm characteristics (those most closely held), achieve higher returns. 
 
A significant relationship was found between the two distance measures as expected.  
The negative correlation shows that firms ranking as distant on one of the distance 
variables were associated with more distant rankings on the other distance variable.  This 
correlation gives weight to the methodology behind the determination of both variables. 
 
Distance Measure 
The Spearman Rank-Order tests found a significant correlation between three of the 
Financial Return measures (ROE, ROA, and ROAG) and Distance Measure.  The 
negative correlation indicated that more closely held firms are associated with greater 
returns.  ROA returned the greatest correlation and the most significant result.  This adds 
further support to the finding above that; the degree of owner involvement in the 
management of a firm has a bearing on financial returns. 
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The common elements present in the measurement of ROA and the Distance 
Measure should be noted.  The Distance Measure is represented as net shareholder loans 
(to or from) the business as a percentage of total assets.  Therefore, it is not surprising 
that a significant relationship is present with the Return on Assets-based financial return 
measures. 
 
Median Tests 
The Median Test was used to test for differences in Financial Returns across three 
groups that were segmented according to increasing variable measures of Risk Grade, 
Distance Grade and Distance Measure.  The groups were made up according to Table 5 
below. 
 
Table 5: 
Groupings by Risk Grade, Distance Grade and Distance Ratio 
  No. of Observations 
Risk Grade Group 1 – Risk Grades 35-50 
Group 2 – Risk Grades 52-55 
Group 3 – Risk Grades 57-92 
 
27 
31  
42 
 
 
100 
Distance Grade Group 1 – Distance 1-3 
Group 2 – Distance 4-5 
Group 3 – Distance 6-9 
 
42 
29  
29 
 
 
100 
Distance Measure Group 1 – Lifestyle 0 – 0.02211 
Group 2 – Lifestyle 02969-0.16359 
Group 3 – Lifestyle 0.17795-1.09653 
 
33 
34  
33 
 
 
100 
 
 
The results are summarised in Table 6.  A test was also done to verify if Distance 
Measures were different across the Distance Grade groups, as indicated by the correlation 
test above. 
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Table 6: 
Median Tests for Differences in Financial Returns across Groups 
  Risk Grade 
Groups 
Distance Grade 
Groups 
Distance Measure 
Groups 
Financial  χ
2 
χ
2 
χ
2 
Return ROE 1.311 **** 4.036 ****
*** 
2.360 ****
* 
 ROA 1.339 **** 0.726 **** 8.046 ****
**** 
 ROEG 0.461 *** 3.379 ****
*** 
0.178 ** 
 ROAG 0.165 ** 0.069 * 3.683 ****
*** 
Distance 
Measure 
  2.696 ****
** 
 
 
Key: 
Probability that 
returns across different  
****
**** 
****
*** 
****
** 
****
* 
**** *** ** * 
groups are the same 
.0
1
-.
0
2
 
.1
0
-.
2
0
 
.2
0
-.
3
0
 
.3
0
-.
5
0
 
.5
0
-.
7
0
 
.7
0
-.
8
0
 
.9
0
-.
9
5
 
.9
5
-.
9
8
 
 
 
These results add further weight to the findings above.  It is, at least, 50% likely that 
Financial Returns (of any measure) are the same across the different Risk Grade groups 
and this supports the findings that Risk Grade and Financial Return are not related.  
However, the results for the distance-based groups are more significant.  The probability 
that ROE or ROEG are the same across the different Distance Grade groups is only 0.10 
– 0.20.  For the Distance Measure groups, the probability that ROA is the same is only 
0.01 – 0.02, while this probability for ROAG is 0.10 – 0.20.  The observations above, 
with the median increasing for the more closely held firms, support the findings of a 
positive relationship between returns and closely-held firms. 
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The Median Test for a difference in the Distance Measure across the different 
Distance Grade groups found that the probability that the measures are the same was 
between 0.20 and 0.30.  This is consistent with the correlation test above, and again infers 
that the distance measures are related and, as such, must be measuring some common 
element(s).  This supports the methodology used to measure distance. 
 
Agency cost control factor tests 
Table 7 below shows the results (rs) of Spearman rank-order correlation tests for a 
relationship between the distance measures and external debt and dividends.  Z-scores are 
show in brackets. 
 
Table 7: 
Tests for Agency Cost Control Characteristics Across Groups 
  Distance Grade Distance Measure 
  (most closely held = 1) (least closely-held = 1) 
External Debt/Total Assets -0.0669 0.1369 
(highest % = 1) (-0.6656) (1.3519) 
Dividends/NPAT (%) -0.0773 -0.1144 
(lowest % = 1) (-0.7694) (-1.1386) 
Total Disbursements*/OPAT** -0.1752 0.2035 
(lowest % = 1) (-1.7428)*** (2.0245)*** 
 
Key 
 *  Total disbursements = Above line shareholder disbursements + Dividends. 
**  OPAT = Operating Profit After Tax = NPAT + Above line shareholder disbursements 
***  Significant at 0.05 level. 
 
The sample did not exhibit any significant relationship between distance and 
External Debt/Total Assets.  This infers that the use of debt is not a conscious decision by 
owners to reduce the agency costs of external equity.  This supports the findings of Vos 
and Forlong (1996) who found the agency advantages of debt in small firms to be nil.  
There was no significant relationship between Dividends/NPAT and distance, which 
suggests that privately-held firms use neither dividends nor debt to control agency costs.  
However, the significant correlation found between Total-disbursements-to-shareholders 
and both distance variables, points to a relationship between greater disbursements and 
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distance.  This is what would be expected if dividends/payments-to-shareholders were 
used in order to control agency costs by removing financial slack (Ang, 1992).   It is 
likely that above line payments (such as management fees/salaries/shareholder interest) 
are used in addition to, or instead of, dividends in order to minimise tax liability and this 
is why a significant relationship is exhibited with total disbursements and not dividends. 
 
The Chi Square Tests performed on the three groups established for each distance 
variable were used to test if there was a significant difference between the distance 
groups in the proportion of firms who “pay dividends” or “don’t pay dividends”.   Table 
8 shows the numbers of firms paying and not paying dividends in each Distance Grade 
group, while Table 9 shows the numbers for each Distance Ratio group.  The expected 
number occurring (e) is based on  the Null Hypothesis that the three groups are equal 
being true.  
 
Table 8: 
Actual and Expected observations of firms paying dividends - Distance Grade 
Groups 
  Group One Group Two Group Three Total 
Pay Dividends Actual (n) 19 16 15 50 
 Expected (e) 21 14.5 14.5 50 
No Dividends Actual  23 13 14 50 
 Expected 21 14.5 14.5 50 
TOTAL Actual  42 29 29 100 
 Expected 42 29 29 100 
 
The Chi-Square test statistic (χ2) of 0.725, resulting from calculations using the 
tabulated results above, means the probability of the Null Hypothesis being true is 0.50- 
0.70 for Distance Grade Groups.  Therefore there is insufficient evidence to reject the 
Null Hypothesis that the ratio of dividend paying firms is the same across the three 
groups. 
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Table 9: 
Actual and Expected observations of firms paying dividends – Distance Measure 
Groups 
  Group One Group Two Group Three Total 
Dividends Actual (n) 21 16 13 50 
 Expected (e) 16.5 17 16.5 50 
No Dividends Actual  12 18 20 50 
 Expected 16.5 17 16.5 50 
TOTAL Actual  33 34 33 100 
 Expected 33 34 33 100 
 
The χ2 of 4.02 for the Distance Measure group (calculated using the results in Table 
8) indicates only a 0.10 - 0.20 probability of the groups having the same proportions of 
dividend paying firms.  Therefore, there is a likelihood of a higher proportion of firms 
paying dividends in Groups 1 and 2 (the less closely-held firms). 
 
When combined, the above results present a mixed picture.  On the one hand, 
Distance Grade does not seem to relate to the number of firms paying dividends, but on 
the other hand, the Distance Measure results show that less-closely held firms (i.e. more 
distant firms) are more likely to pay dividends.  It should however be noted that neither 
of these results are strong results, creating the possibly that as far as a relationship 
between dividends and distance is concerned, the results are inconclusive. 
 
Table 10: 
Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Tests for Distance Grades of 1-4 versus 5-9. .   
 
 
ROE ROA ROEG ROAG 
Z value -0.357 0.022 -0.537 0.056 
P value  0.183 0.093 0.969 0.263 
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The Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Tests returned positive differences for both ROA and 
ROAG.  That is, the ROA and ROAG of the firms with Distance Grades of 1-4 
(inclusive) tended to be higher than those firms with Distance Grades of 5-9 (inclusive).  
This indicates that more closely held firms utilized their assets more efficiently.  
However, the differences were negative for ROE and ROEG, which means that, overall, 
the firms with Distance Grades of 5-9 had better equity returns.  This is opposite to what 
was expected. 
 
 
6.0  CONCLUSIONS 
 
The results presented in this report lead to a number of interesting conclusions.  This 
study failed to find any significant relationship between financial returns and total risk (as 
measured by the bank’s risk grading system).  Only ROA recorded a significant 
relationship with Risk Grade, and even then this was relatively weak and opposite to the 
expected sign.  The variability of the accounting based returns (including the non-
leveraged ROA and ROAG measures) infers that any measure of risk used in modeling 
these returns must be comprehensive.   
 
However, it should be noted that there is a “dual hypothesis” problem inherent in this 
study.  Although the risk factor is being tested, one cannot say that the accounting returns 
assumed are the correct measures of financial return.  Despite this, the fact that no 
significant relationship with risk was found is important.  It may be appropriate to seek 
further support for these findings by contrasting them with findings based on cash flow 
measures of return. 
 
This paper reinforces previous studies (Vos (1992, 1995)) making it difficult to disregard 
the lack of correlation found between risk and return in small business empirical studies.  
Risk based return models, including the CAPM, may be heading in the wrong direction.  
Along with this, both distance variables were more closely related to Financial Returns 
than the Risk Grade.  Both variables point to more closely-held firms being associated 
with greater ROA, ROE and ROAG.  This affirms the agency theory explanation of Ang 
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et al (2000) that agency costs increase as owners of a firm become more distant from the 
management of that firm. 
 
There is also some evidence to suggest that owners of more distant firms take action 
to prevent agency costs.  No significant relationship was found between the use of debt 
and distance (supporting Vos and Forlong’s (1996) findings that small firms use debt 
only out of necessity).  However more distant firms were associated with greater 
disbursements of operating profit to their shareholders.  An explanation could be that 
owners of more distant firms do not trust their managers with excess funds, so they keep 
the amount of funds available to managers to a minimum through disbursements to 
themselves. 
 
The prevalence of a relationship between financial returns and distance, suggests 
that the development of a new small firm model of returns is valid and necessary.  This 
is re-iterated by the lack of any risk/return relationships found.  Alternatives to risk-
based models should be pursued.  In particular, modeling centered on agency theory and 
the degree of owner involvement in business management should be considered.  Further 
research on financial return modelling for small businesses could be built around the 
form: 
Expected Return = ƒ (Risk Free Rate, Distance Measure) 
 
where: Distance Measure is greater for more closely held firms with a single 
owner/manager and lower agency costs structure along with smaller (or 
negative) for firms with a number of external stakeholders that has implicitly 
higher agency costs involved. 
 
Analysis of alternative measures of return should be examined in addition to the 
accounting measures used in this research.  By contrasting the results of this study with 
those obtained using alternative measures of return, we further insight would be gained 
into the appropriateness of risk/return models in finance theory.  
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